进程沙箱
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dsh-sandbox 的进程沙箱 seam 将与配套子进程提供方共享执行环境的子进程 argv 包装在文件效果策略中，而不将消费方耦合到特定平台运行器。dsh-sandbox-local 提供 Linux bwrap/Landlock、macOS Seatbelt 与 Windows ACL 受限令牌后端；dsh-bash-sandbox 和 dsh-pwsh-sandbox 是其消费方。dsh-sandbox-ssh 通过与 SSH 文件系统及子进程提供方配套的远端后端执行同一策略。
源码：packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts
模式与强制执行
SandboxMode 仅管控文件系统效果。read-only 要求后端拒绝写入——POSIX runner 还会授予其 shell 所需的 /dev/null 接收器，而 Windows ACL runner 不授予任何显式可写根目录，并因环境 ACL 缺口报告部分强制执行；workspace-write 允许在工作区根目录及后端承诺的临时区域下写入；danger-full-access 绕过隔离。网络与进程可见性不在此处的定义范围内。
``ts type-equiv
/**
* File-effect policy for confined processes.read-onlypermits only required
* sinks such as/dev/null;workspace-writealso permits the workspace and a
* backend-defined temp area;danger-full-access` bypasses confinement. Network
* and process visibility are outside this vocabulary.
*/
type SandboxMode = 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access'
只有前两种模式可以发送给提供方。`danger-full-access` 的消费方直接 spawn 原始 argv，不调用 `ctx.sandbox`。
```ts type-equiv
/** A confining (non-`danger-full-access`) mode — the modes a {@link SandboxPolicy} can carry. */
type ConfinedSandboxMode = Exclude<SandboxMode, 'danger-full-access'>
强制执行完整性是后端报告的事实。full 表示后端管控了该模式承诺的所有文件效果；partial 表示活跃后端或较旧的内核 ABI 仅管控其中一个子集，因此要求绝对保证的消费方必须拒绝或向上暴露这一区别。当前的部分强制执行情形包括较旧的 Landlock ABI，以及 Windows ACL runner 的硬链接、读取不受限与 AppContainer ACL 边界。
``ts type-equiv
/**
* Enforcement completeness for this host.partialmeans an active backend or
* older kernel ABI cannot govern every promised file effect; callers requiring
* an absolute boundary must not treat it asfull`.
*/
type SandboxEnforcement = 'full' | 'partial'
## 逐调用策略
完整执行策略会按每次能力调用解析并携带。它包括 `danger-full-access`，因此消费方可以只解析一次策略，再决定是否绕过约束。普通工具调用从调用会话的不可变 cwd 派生 `workspaceRoot`；部署配置是没有 agent（智能体）时的回退值。解析器保留执行环境中的绝对路径写法。执行限制的提供方在文件实际存在的位置规范化根目录，因此包含 `symlink/..` 的 cwd 会标识配套子进程提供方实际运行的目录。
```ts type-equiv
/**
* The complete file-effect policy resolved for one capability call. The root
* is carried even under modes that do not consume it so callers can resolve
* policy once before choosing the enforcement path.
*/
interface SandboxExecutionPolicy {
/** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
mode: SandboxMode
/** Absolute root directory `workspace-write` may write under. */
workspaceRoot: string
/**
* Opaque identity of the calling session (the branded `dsh-session`
* SessionId). Backends key per-session state off it (e.g. windows-acl gives
* each live session/workspace pair a random private temp directory and SID,
* while the workspace SID and standing grant remain per-workspace); absent
* for agentless calls, which fall back to per-call backend state.
*/
sessionId?: SessionId
}
ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve() 接收活跃会话；对于已批准的重试，还接收显式模式。该服务拥有优先级与 root 回退规则，使 bash 和 fs 不必重复实现。
```ts type-equiv / Inputs that select the sandbox policy for one capability call. */ interface SandboxPolicyRequest { / Calling session; its immutable cwd becomes the workspace boundary. / session?: Session / Explicit approved mode override, which outranks session policy. / mode?: SandboxMode }
只有受约束的执行会到达 `ctx.sandbox`；传给提供方的策略在保留同一 root 的同时收窄模式。这使并发会话、消费方与一次性提权重试可以向同一提供方请求不同边界，而无需改变提供方状态。
```ts type-equiv
/**
* What one confined execution is allowed to touch — carried PER CALL, not
* fixed on the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies
* at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent
* needs its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is a
* new call with a wider policy. Defaulting/resolution is an explicit step at
* the consumer boundary; the provider treats the policy as fully specified.
*/
interface SandboxPolicy extends SandboxExecutionPolicy {
/** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
}
包装后的 argv 与分类方言
RunnerFailureRule 汇集用于判定 runner 在执行命令前失败的证据。消费方要求进程以非零状态退出，并同时满足可选的允许退出码门控，以及余下某一 stderr 行中不区分大小写的致命签名。系统会先按不区分大小写的整行精确匹配移除信息性排除项，因此无害的 runner 通知本身不能证明失败。匹配到的行仍可用作错误详情；分类过程不会重写 stderr。
```ts type-equiv / * Evidence that identifies a sandbox runner failing before it executes the * wrapped command. A consumer first applies {@link allowedExitCodes} when * present, removes {@link informationalLines} by case-insensitive exact line * equality, then matches {@link fatalSignatures} case-insensitively within * each remaining stderr line. Exit status alone never proves runner failure. */ interface RunnerFailureRule { / Nonzero process exit codes on which this rule may match; omitted permits any nonzero exit. / allowedExitCodes?: readonly number[] / Non-empty substrings identifying a fatal runner diagnostic on one stderr line. / fatalSignatures: readonly string[] /* Benign stderr lines excluded by exact full-line equality before fatal matching. / informationalLines?: readonly string[] }
`ConfinedArgv` 是消费方实际 spawn 的内容。除了替换后的 argv，它还携带后端的强制执行事实和两种正交的 stderr 分类器。`denialSignatures` 用于识别沙箱正常工作时受限命令被阻止的情况。`runnerFailureRules` 用于识别沙箱 runner 在执行命令之前拒绝或失败的情况；消费方应先检查后者，将其作为沙箱基础设施故障上报，而非普通任务失败。
```ts type-equiv
/**
* A {@link SandboxProvider.confine} result: the argv to spawn in place of
* the caller's own, plus the enforcement completeness the selected backend
* achieves for it.
*/
interface ConfinedArgv {
/** The wrapped argv (runner, profile, separator, then the caller's argv). */
argv: string[]
/** How completely the selected backend enforces the policy's file effects. */
enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
/**
* The selected backend's denial DIALECT: the case-insensitive stderr
* substrings a file effect denied by THIS backend produces (EROFS text
* under bwrap's read-only binds, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under
* Seatbelt). A consumer that infers denials from a failed run's stderr
* matches against exactly these rather than a cross-backend union — the
* union claims denials a given backend never produces.
*/
denialSignatures: readonly string[]
/**
* Structured runner-failure evidence rules. Consumers require a matching
* fatal stderr line (after informational exclusions) and any rule-specific
* exit-code gate before checking denial signatures: runner failure means the
* command never ran, while denial means confinement worked and blocked it.
*/
runnerFailureRules: readonly RunnerFailureRule[]
}
本地提供方拥有运维配置，并将其 runner 方言映射到这些规则。沙箱化 bash 消费方拥有 spawn 与结果归因。
提供方与 fail-closed 错误
await ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy, signal) 在执行环境中解析策略路径并返回 ConfinedArgv，没有可用后端时以 SandboxUnavailableError（错误码 SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE）拒绝。可选信号可在启动前取消解析。消费方也可以在 spawn 或观察所返回的 argv 时对失败进行分类；该归因属于消费方约定。对于受限策略，静默的无隔离透传永远不合法。
提供方选择、探测、缓存和后端特定的强制执行报告归本地提供方所有。
Cordis API
Generated from source by scripts/gen-cordis-catalog.ts (verified fresh by pnpm run verify-cordis-catalog in doc-sync; regenerate with pnpm run gen-cordis-catalog) — the language sides differ only in locale-specific paired document paths. Signature blocks use a ts cordis-catalog fence and keep the original source JSDoc; dispatch modes are defined in the primer, and the framework-inherited ctx API lives in cordis-api/inherited.md.
ctx.sandbox — SandboxProvider (abstract seam)
Abstract process-sandbox service. confine must return enforcing argv or fail closed at wrap or runner-execution time; silent unconfined passthrough is forbidden. Functional probes arbitrate multi-runner chains and may be skipped for a sole candidate, whose own refusal remains the fail-closed end.
``ts cordis-catalog
/**
* Wrapargvso it executes confined underpolicyon this host; the
* caller spawns the returned argv in place of its own.
* @param argv - the exact argv the caller is about to spawn (program plus
* arguments), NOT a shell string — a shell-shaped consumer passes
*['bash', '-c', command]`.
* @param policy - the file-effect policy this execution runs under,
* carried per call (see {@link SandboxPolicy}).
* @param signal - cancellation while the provider resolves the policy and runner.
* @returns the argv to spawn instead, plus the enforcement completeness
* the selected backend achieves for it.
*/
abstract confine(argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise
Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts)
<a id="ctxsandboxpolicy--sandboxpolicyservice"></a>
### `ctx.sandboxPolicy` — `SandboxPolicyService`
The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`). Owns the deployment default mode, fallback workspace root, and current request-time policy section. Tool layers call resolve for each execution so a session's mode log and immutable cwd travel together to every enforcing capability.
```ts cordis-catalog
/**
* Resolve the complete policy for one capability call. An approved explicit
* mode outranks the session's last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks the
* deployment default. A session cwd is its workspace-write boundary; the
* configured root is the fallback for agentless calls and sessions without a
* cwd.
* @param request - optional session and approved mode override.
* @returns the fully resolved per-call mode and absolute workspace root.
*/
resolve(request: SandboxPolicyRequest = {}): SandboxExecutionPolicy
/**
* Read the session override without applying the deployment default.
* @param session - session whose log supplies the override.
* @returns the last logged mode, or `undefined` without one.
*/
overrideOf(session: Session): SandboxMode | undefined
Types: Session